Strawson's view on punishment has been either neglected or recoiled from in contemporary scholarship on ‘Freedom and Resentment’ (FR). Strawson's alleged retributivism has made his view suspect and troublesome. In this article, we first argue, against the mainstream, that the punishment passage is an indispensable part of the main argument in FR (section 1) and elucidate in what sense Strawson can be called ‘a retributivist’ (section 2). We then elaborate our own hypothesis of symbolic retribution to explain the continuum between (...) moral reactive attitudes and punishment that Strawson only adumbrates (section 3). After this justification of the punitive response to wrongdoing, we compare and contrast our specific kind of retributivist hypothesis with other positions in the so-called ‘new retributivism’ (section 4). Our hypothesis differs from other subvarieties of expressive retributivism in putting centre stage the idea of punishment as taking up a reverential stance towards the victim. (shrink)

There is still something to be said about these figures for the Athenian hoplite force, the more so as the most reasonable discussion of them, Meyer's, is spoilt by some unsound inferences and has in consequence not found support. Their difficulty is apparent: a muster πανσημει in 338 meant calling up all classes up to the age of 50 , and since Socrates fought at Delion and Amphipolis when he was in his late forties, and not at Mantineia when he (...) was over 50, we may assume that it meant the same in the fifth century; we also assume that ‘the youngest’ are those in their nineteenth and twentieth years, as in the fourth century, certainly after the reform of the Ephebeia, perhaps earlier ; military service ceased at 60. But how could the number of men in these twelve classes, 19-20 and 51-60, stand in the proportion of 13: 17 to the men between 21 and 50 ? They could not be more than a third, and might be less. (Beloch, 1923, tries to make the problem more difficult by the arbitrary assumption that the 13,000 citizen hoplites are all the men of 21-60, instead of 21-50. Meyer, who accepts Thucydides’ figures, forgets that there must have been ‘oldest and youngest’ metics, besides the 3,000 who marched into Megara. Busolt and Meyer also argue that the classes 51-60 will have suffered specially heavy losses in the battles of 459-445, while the eight youngest classes would have seen no fighting. (shrink)

The interpretation of in this context raises some nice problems. It is a term, a very flattering one, which had been appropriated to themselves by a certain class, in many cities at least, and by Dorians in relation to ‘Ionians and islanders’; it had thus become a cant phrase in current usage, the kind of phrase which when used tauntingly, as here, or ironically should be given inverted commas.

It is always a pity to spoil an old joke, especially one that belongs to one's own profession, which has been repeated time and again, for generations, whenever a teacher of Greek is concerned with the passages in question; but when the hearty laughter is over and the last echoes of it from our obedient pupils have faded away, let us examine the Greek again.

My inverted commas are intended; I mean, of whom are Schwartz and Jacoby thinking when they say that the History which was called Kratippos' was a forgery of the second or of the first century B.C. ? The reason for the question is this: most forgeries are of the form, ‘Here is an epigram by Simonides, a new chapter by Thucydides’; or ‘I, a humble scholar or an unknown person, X, have discovered the lost books of Livy, or a hitherto (...) unknown painting by Vermeer, or a privately printed edition of Sonnets from the Portuguese’; that is, the work forged is said to be by a famous person, the discoverer a relatively obscure one. Schwartz and Jacoby, however, say, or imply, that ‘Kratippos’ was the name of the forger, a man who lived, probably, in the first century B.C., and who deceived Dionysios of Halikarnassos and Plutarch ; but what did he assert that his history was ? Did he say, ‘I, Kratippos, have discovered a lost history dating from a generation after the end of the Peloponnesian war which is a continuation of Thucydides; authorship unknown’? Clearly not, for Dionysios says, and Plutarch quite plainly implies, that they took ‘Kratippos’ to be an author of the early fourth century. (shrink)

DR. G. Zuntz's excellent paper on these verses in Proc. Brit. Acad. xlii , 209–46, deserves all our thanks for the clarity and good sense of its exposition, and for clearing away much unnecessary comment that has been encumbering the fragment, especially Bignone's theory that it derives its philosophy directly from Aristotle's Protreptikos, with Körte's supplement that it is indivisible—that there is no break at v. 7; see Körte's Menandri quae supersunt , ii. 147–8. There is, however, I think, room (...) for further comment on Zuntz's interpretation of the lines, and on his view that die fragment known as Papyrus Didotiana b may belong to the same play, Hypobolimaios. (shrink)

Susan Wolf argues that meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness. Whereas we can agree with her claim that the conception of meaning invokes an objective standard, we think it is questionable whether a radically subjective fulfillment is a real possibility. Several reasons are provided why this cannot be the case.

Peter Strawson makes a crucial distinction between reactive attitudes and the objective attitude. Reactive attitudes such as gratefulness, anger and indignation imply that we take each other seriously as responsible agents. The objective attitude implies that we stop taking each other seriously. Strawson argues that the objective attitude is not merely psychologically difficult: it is inconceivable that we would systematically refrain from taking each other seriously and stop discussing with each other or blaming ourselves or others. Strawson, however, only discusses (...) the reactive attitudes from a general point of view. In this paper, we argue that the reactive attitudes of remorse and moral indignation are forms of ”symbolic restoration’. Retributive punishment should also be interpreted from this perspective. Consequently, our concern with moral blame cannot be understood independently from a concern with the harm that has occurred. Our attitude to the outcome determines our attitude to the agent. The concern with the mental state is secondary: it is structured by its place within the practice of symbolic restoration. (shrink)

Utopianism aims at a global transformation in virtue of which both the external world and our own reality will develop in such ways as to be in greater harmony with our wishes. What utopianism does not take into account, however, is the existence of two important kinds of desire. In the first place, human beings have the need to react symbolically to what cannot be changed. In the second place, they also have a desire for recognition and for a significant (...) life. With these desires, human beings have aims that go beyond morality’s protective ideals. Offering the example of transhumanism as a paradigm case of utopianism in our own days, the present article illustrates how utopianism ignores the fact that human beings indirectly desire that certain of their objects of desire remain beyond their control. (shrink)

In Physics 4.11, Aristotle says that changes are continuous because magnitude is continuous. I suggest that this is not Aristotle’s considered view, and that in Generation and Corruption 2.10 Aristotle argues that this leads to the unacceptable consequence that alterations can occur discontinuously. Physics 6.4 was written to amend this theory, and to argue that changes are continuous because changing bodies are so. I also discuss the question of Aristotle’s consistency on the possibility of discontinuous alterations, such as freezing.